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W–like bound entangled states and secure key distillation
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We construct multipartite entangled states with underlying W –type structure satisfying positive
partial transpose (PPT) condition under any (N − 1)|1 partition. Then we show how to distill N–
partite secure key form the states using two different methods: direct application of local filtering and
novel random key distillation scheme in which we adopt the idea form recent results on entanglement
distillation. Open problems and possible implications are also discussed.
PACS numbers:
Introduction. – Quantum cryptography [1, 2] is an
impressive information–theoretic application of quantum
physical laws in data security theory. The proofs [3, 4]
of unconditional security of pioneering quantum crypto-
graphic protocol [1] refer to the idea of quantum privacy
amplification [5] based on entanglement distillation pro-
tocol [6]. This refers back to the cryptographic protocol
[2] which is based on shared pure entanglement and is
in fact the first explicit application of entanglement in
information theory. Since then we already know that all
correlation–based cryptographic protocols require entan-
glement as a necessary resource [7]. While it was natural
to expect that distillation of pure entanglement is nec-
essary to cryptography, it happened that even nondistil-
lable entanglement known as a bound entanglement [8]
may, at least in some cases, be useful for cryptography
[9] with the corresponding general entanglement–based
cryptographic paradigm going beyond entanglement dis-
tillation developed in [10] (for recent interesting appli-
cations in security proofs and physical analysis of secu-
rity see Refs. [11, 12]). Recently multipartite version of
the latter has been worked out in Refs. [13, 14]. Espe-
cially in the latter multipartite bound entanglement has
been constructed based on twisted GHZ–type of entan-
glement. Here we present a nonstandard application of
the paradigm with a novel type of multipartite bound
entanglement, namely the one with underlying W -like
structure. We adopt here the idea of random distilla-
tion of entanglement [15, 16] introducing the notion of
random distillation of secure key. The latter seems to
be much more efficient for the present states than the
concatenation of usual bipartite protocols with classical
postprocessing.
N–partite noisy W–like states passing single–
system PPT test. – Below we provide a detailed con-
struction of bound entangled states, which exhibit the
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structure of noisy W states, where the latter are defined
as N–qubit pure states of the form
|W 〉 = (1/
√
N)(|10 . . . 0〉+|01 . . .0〉+. . .+|0 . . . 01〉). (1)
We give a detailed proof that partial transposition with
respect to each single–party subsystem is positive.
Let us start by introducing the following matrices
ZD =
D−1∑
i,j=0
uij |ii〉〈jj|, RD =
D−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|, (2)
where uij denotes elements of some unitary matrix UD.
The sum of absolute values of all elements of UD will be
denoted by UD. For simplicity we can also assume UD to
be Hermitian. Now let us define
X
(N)
D = Z
Γ2
1,2 ⊗ . . .⊗ ZΓii−1,i ⊗ ZΓi+1i,i+1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ZΓ1N,1, (3)
where subscripts indicate that the matrix represents
parts of i–th and j–th party and Γj stands for partial
transposition with respect to the subsystem belonging to
j–th party. Moreover, addition is modulo N . For in-
stance ZΓ21,2 is a part of quantum systems belonging to
the first and second party that must be transposed with
respect to the second party.
Let us now shortly discuss the properties of X
(N)
D .
Firstly, since |Zi,i+1| = |ZTi,i+1| = RD (i = 1, . . . , N) and∣∣ZΓkk−1,k∣∣ = ∑D−1i,j=0 |uij ||ji〉〈ji| (≡ Zk−1,k), one concludes
that
∣∣∣X (N)ΓiD
∣∣∣ =
i−2⊗
k=1
Zk,k+1⊗R(2)D ⊗R(2)D ⊗
N⊗
k=i+1
Zk,k+1. (4)
All the matrices
∣∣X (N)ΓiD ∣∣ are diagonal and, as such, they
are invariant under the action of partial transposition. It
is also clear that
∣∣X(N)D ∣∣ =⊗Nk=1 Zk,k+1 which together
with Eq. (4) allows to infer that∥∥∥X(N)ΓiD
∥∥∥
1
= UN−2D D2 and
∥∥∥X(N)D
∥∥∥
1
= UND . (5)
2for any i = 1, . . . , N . Now we are prepared to present
the construction. For this purpose let us introduce
Y
(N)
D =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X(N)ΓiD
∣∣∣ (6)
and denote by |ψ(N)i 〉 (|ψ(N)ij 〉) pure N–qubit states in
which i–th party (i–th and j–th parties) posses |1〉 and
the remaining parties have |0〉. Let also P(N)i and P(N)ij
be projectors onto |ψ(N)i 〉 and |ψ(N)ij 〉, respectively.
Then we can consider the following class of states
̺
(D,N)
AA′
=
1
N
(N)
D


N∑
i,j=1
i6=j
∣∣ψ(N)i 〉〈ψ(N)j ∣∣⊗X(N)D
+(N − 1)|0〉〈0|⊗N ⊗ Y (N)D +
N∑
i,j=1
i<j
P(N)ij ⊗ Y (N)D
+
N∑
i,j=1
P(N)i ⊗
[
(N − 1)
∣∣∣X(N)D
∣∣∣+ (N − 2)Y (N)D
]

 ,(7)
where the normalization factor is given by
N
(N)
D = NUN−2D
[
(N − 1)U2D + (D2/2)(3N2 − 3N − 2)
]
.
The subscripts A ≡ A1 . . . AN and A′ ≡ A′1 . . . A′N denote
the key part and shield part of the state. They are sepa-
rated by the tensor product visible in Eq. (7). ”Every-
thing” that is on the left–hand side of this sign belongs
to A and everything on the right–hand side belongs to
A
′. Usually one considers the situation in which the i–
th party has two subsystems denoted here by Ai and
A′i (one from A and one from A
′). However, in a more
general scenario we can also assume that the whole A′
is held by some other but trusted party or even more
trusted parties.
Let us now check the positivity of partial transposi-
tion with respect to the i–th subsystem. Straightforward
algebra shows that ̺
(D,N)Γi
AA′
is of the form (Eq. (8)).
̺
(D,N)Γk
AA′
=
1
N
(N)
D




N∑
i=1
i6=k
(|0〉⊗N〈ψ(N)ik ∣∣+ ∣∣ψ(N)ik 〉〈0|⊗N)⊗X(N)ΓkD +(N − 1)|0〉〈0|⊗N ⊗ Y (N)D +
N∑
i=1
i6=k
P(N)ik ⊗ Y (N)D


+

(N − 2)
N∑
i=1
i6=k
P(N)i ⊗ Y (N)D +
N∑
i,j=1
i6=j, i,j 6=k
∣∣ψ(N)i 〉〈ψ(N)j ∣∣⊗X(N)ΓkD

+ P(N)k ⊗
[
(N − 1)
∣∣∣X(N)D
∣∣∣+ (N − 2)Y (N)D
]
+
N∑
i,j=1
i<j, i,j 6=k
P(N)ij ⊗ Y (N)D

 . (8)
To make the analysis simpler, some of the terms in the
above were grouped in square brackets. The positivity
of the first and second brackets follows straightforwardly
from results of Ref. [14] (see Lemma A.1). The remaining
two terms are positive as Y
(N)
D ≥ 0.
Thus we showed that partial transposition with respect
to any single–party subsystem AiA
′
i is positive. This in-
dicates that the states ̺
(D,N)
AA′
are bound entangled pro-
vided that they are entangled. However, the latter still
needs to be shown. For this purpose below we discuss
cryptographical applicability of these states.
Secure key distillation. – We prove that it is possi-
ble to distill a nonzero amount of cryptographic key from
the states ̺
(D,N)
AA′
. For this aim we show that one can dis-
till a bipartite secure key between any pair of parties of
̺
(D,N)
AA′
. Let us focus on the scenario in which the remain-
ing N−2 parties cooperate ”passively”, i.e., they perform
no action but are trusted (do not cooperate with Eve).
In this case the distillable key[24] can only be higher than
in a scenario in which the remaining N − 2 parties would
give some of their systems to Eve. Thus, for our purposes
it suffices to investigate the bipartite distillable key of the
states[25] ̺
(D,N)
AkAlA′
= TrA\{k,l}̺
(D,N)
AA′
for any k 6= l (note
that tracing out the subsystems may be treated as giving
them to Eve). As in what follows the additional systems
are not directly used in secure key distillation and the
remaining parties are trusted, we can considerably sim-
plify the analysis by applying the general bipartite cryp-
3tographical paradigm studied in [9, 10]. Indeed, we can
even consider the system A′ as one distributed between
Ak and Al. However, it does not mean that the consid-
ered scenario is only bipartite since the total protocol will
consist of bipartite protocols with different pairs {k, l}.
We investigate the bipartite distillable key using two
methods. The first one is quite simple application of
local filtering, while the second one, probably more ef-
ficient, bases on the ideas of random distillation of en-
tanglement given in Refs. [15, 16]. Both protocols, are
finally concatenated with the Devetak–Winter (DW) pro-
tocol [17, 18].
We also simplify our considerations by imposing some
constraints on UD, namely, we assume that all of its en-
tries obey |uij | = 1/
√
D. An example of such a unitary
Hermitian matrix is the matrix H⊗k, with H being the
Hadamard matrix (here D = 2k). In this case UD =
D
√
D and what is important here
∥∥X(N)D ∥∥/∥∥Y (N)D ∥∥ =
D/N , which is greater than one for sufficiently large D.
Twistings and privacy squeezing. In view of what was
said previously it suffices to restrict our considerations to
the distillation of bipartite secure key. The general cryp-
tographical paradigm of Refs. [9, 10, 19] is exactly what
we need here. Thus, below we recall some of its main
ideas, namely, twistings and the privacy squeezing [10]
with its application in the recent method [19] of bounding
the key form below. Possible multipartite generalizations
of the paradigm were studied in Refs. [13, 14].
Let then ̺ABA′B′ denote some bipartite state with the
AB (A′B′) part called the key (shield) part (notice once
more that in general in the considered scenario one does
not have to demand that the A′B′ part belong to the
involved parties as it may be in possession of some other
trusted party). Now, let B = {|ij〉} denote some product
basis in the Hilbert space corresponding to the AB part.
Then one defines the ccq state ̺
(ccq)
ABE to be a state that
arises upon a measurement of the AB part of a purifica-
tion |ψABA′B′E〉 of ̺ABA′B′ in the product basis B and
tracing out the shield part A′B′ (in the usual scenarios
the shield part is treated then as a trivial subsystem).
Now, we define twisting (with respect to the basis B)
to be the following operation:
Ut =
∑
i,j
|ij〉〈ij| ⊗ Uij , (9)
where in general Uij denote some isometries acting on the
A′B′ part. The important fact connected to twistings is
that ̺ABA′B′ and its twisted version Ut̺ABA′B′U
†
t have
the same ccq state (with respect to the same basis).
The last concept we would like to mention here is the
so–called privacy squeezing. Namely, by ”rotating” the
state ̺ABA′B′ with some appropriately chosen twisting
Ut and then tracing out its shield part we get the privacy
squeezed state ˜̺AB = TrA′B′(Ut̺ABA′B′U †t ).
Now, the method applied first in Ref. [19] implies that
taking the purification |Ψ˜ABE〉 of the latter and mea-
suring it in the basis AB produces the ccq state with
CD being a lower bound on distillable key of original
state ̺ABA′B′ . Let us apply this technique carefully to
our example with general shield system A′. Firstly, it
follows from Ref. [10] that in general KD(̺AkAlA′) =
CD(|ψAkAlA′E〉) ≥ CD(̺(ccq)AkAlE), where |ψAkAlA′E〉 stands
for the purification of ̺AkAlA′ , while ̺
(ccq)
AkAlE
denotes the
ccq derived according to the aforementioned prescription.
On the other hand, we can consider a twisted purification
|ψt〉 ≡ Ut ⊗ 1E |ψAkAlA′E〉. As previously mentioned the
ccq state (denoted as σ
(ccq)
AkAlE
) following this purification
is exactly the same as ̺
(ccq)
AkAlE
(in B). Finally, we can con-
sider a worse situation from the point of secure key dis-
tillation between the parties Ak and Al. Namely giving
now the A′ subsystem we can only lower the key. In other
words, we can look at the twisted purification |ψt〉 as
coming from purifying only the AkAl (with the whole sys-
tem E′ = A′E considered to be in Eve’s hands). In this
way we have CD(σ
(ccq)
AkAlE
) ≥ CD(˜̺(ccq)AkAlE′), where ˜̺(ccq)AkAlE′
denotes the ccq state derived in this way. The last step is
an application of the Devetak–Winter protocol to ˜̺(ccq)AkAlE
which gives CD(˜̺(ccq)AkAlE) ≥ I(Ak :Al) − I(Ak :E), where
the quantities[26] I(Ak : Al) and I(Ak : E) are calcu-
lated for respective bipartite reductions of ˜̺(ccq)AkAlE . The
conclusion following this analysis is that KD(̺AkAlA′) ≥
CD(˜̺(ccq)AkAlE) and therefore in what follows we can restrict
to the analysis of distillable key of ˜̺(ccq)AkAlE . In other
words we need to take privacy–squeezed ˜̺(D,N)AkAl version
of ̺
(D,N)
AkAlA′
and analyze lower bounds on the distillable
key of its ccq state.
Note also that any filtering operation diagonal in B
and performed on the key part of the state commutes
with the privacy squeezing operation with respect to the
same basis. This allows to perform local filters on the
privacy–squeezed state instead of the initial one ̺
(D,N)
AA′
.
Direct application of local filters. Without loss of gen-
erality we can assume B to be the standard basis in
C2⊗C2. Then we can derive the privacy–squeezed state
of an arbitrary state ̺AkAlA′ (k 6= l). Choosing in (9) U †01
and U †10 to be unitary matrices from the singular–value
decomposition of X
(N)
D and U00 = U11 = 1D2N , we get
after some calculations from Eq. (7) that
˜̺(D,N)AkAl = 1
N˜
(N)
D


αD,N 0 0 0
0 βD,N D 0
0 D βD,N 0
0 0 0 N

 , (10)
where N˜
(N)
D = N [(N−1)D+(3N2−3N−2)/2], αD,N =
(N − 2)(N − 1)D+ [(3N2− 11N +12)/2]N , and βD,N =
(N − 1)D + 2(N − 2)N .
Since αD,N considerably dominates the remaining en-
tries of ˜̺(D,N)AkAl , the DW protocol does not apply here.
However, using some local filters[27] we can change the
respective entries. So, let us consider the filter Vǫ =
4diag[ǫ, 1] (0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1) and let the k–th and l–th party
apply it. This with probability q
(ǫ)
D,N = Tr
(
V †ǫ Vǫ ⊗
V †ǫ Vǫ ˜̺(D,N)AkAl ) brings ˜̺(D,N)AkAl to the following state
̺
(D,N,ǫ)
AkAl
=
ǫ2
N
(ǫ)
D,N


αD,N ǫ
2 0 0 0
0 βD,N D 0
0 D βD,N 0
0 0 0 N
ǫ2

 (11)
with N
(ǫ)
D,N = αD,N ǫ
4 + 2βD,Nǫ
2 +N . According to the
previous prescription what we need now is to bound from
below the distillable key of the ccq state (in B) of ˜̺(D,N)AkAl .
For this purpose we can firstly find a lower bound on CD
of ̺
(ccq,ǫ)
AkAlE
using the DW protocol, where by ̺
(ccq,ǫ)
AkAlE
we
denoted the ccq state[28] corresponding to the output of
the filtering, i.e., ̺
(D,N,ǫ)
AkAl
. Secondly, as local filtering is
a stochastic operation, multiplying the latter with the
success probability q
(ǫ)
D,N we get the desired result. This,
however, according to the discussion above allows us to
write
KD(̺
(D,N)
AkAlA′
) ≥ q(ǫ)D,N [I(Ak :Al)− I(Ak :E)] , (12)
where both I are calculated from reductions of ̺
(ccq,ǫ)
AkAlE
.
The behaviour of the right–hand side (denoted by K˜
(ǫ,N)
DW )
of Eq. (12) as a function of the filter parameter ǫ and the
dimension D is plotted in Fig. 1 for N = 3 and N = 5.
Despite the rather small values of K˜
(ǫ,N)
DW and the large
dimension D of A′i, it is clear from Fig. 1 that one may
distill a nonzero amount of bipartite key from the states
̺
(D,3)
AA′
and ̺
(D,5)
AA′
.
Finally, we need to show that indeed the possibility
of secure key distillation between any pair of parties of
̺
(D,N)
AA
leads to the distillation of a genuine multipartite
secure key among all the parties. For this purpose notice
firstly that in the general case of an N–partite state it
suffices to have a bipartite secure key among pairsAiAi+1
(i = 1, . . . , N−1). Secondly, let us assume that each such
pair distills a secure key at a rate r. Then one concludes
that in such a configuration all the parties can distill
multipartite key at a rate at least r/(N − 1). Since we
showed that in the case of our states r is nonzero, the
multipartite distillable key of ̺
(D,N)
AA′
is nonzero, at least
in the cases of N = 3, 5.
Alternative approach: the idea of random distillation
of secure key. – Now, basing on the very recent results
of Lo and Fortescue [15, 16], we consider a little bit more
sophisticated way of the bipartite key distillation from
̺
(D,N)
AA′
. For simplicity we focus here only on the case
of N = 3, however, generalization to more parties is
straightforward.
Let us then consider the following POVM Vǫ =
diag[
√
1− ǫ2, 1] and Wǫ = diag[ǫ, 0] (0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1). It is
clear that V †ǫ Vǫ + W
†
ǫ Wǫ = 12, where 12 denotes the
2× 2 identity. Each of the parties applies this POVM to
their ”nonprimed” subsystems Ai (i = 1, 2, 3). Now, we
(a)
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4000
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D
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K
~
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HΕ,3L
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0.06
Ε 200000
400000
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800000
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D
0
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K
~
DW
HΕ,5L
FIG. 1: The dependence of eK
(ǫ,N)
DW on the parameters ǫ and D
for two different values of N , namely, N = 3 (a) and N = 5
(b). Zero is put whenever the plotted function is less than
zero. Also, for clarity, the function is plotted as if it were
continuous in D. It is clear from both the plots that the
number of parties lowers the plotted function.
divide the possible outcomes into three groups. The first
one contains a single element, namely, a result of applica-
tion of V ⊗3ǫ . The second group contains the outcome of
the application of V ⊗2ǫ ⊗Wǫ and two other outcomes be-
ing permutations of Vǫ and Wǫ in V
⊗2
ǫ ⊗Wǫ. Finally, the
third group consists of the remaining outcomes. The re-
sults from the second group are treated as a success since
they lead to secure key distillation. On the contrary any
result from the third group is considered as a failure as
the resulting state has a separable structure with respect
to the key part. In the case when the obtained result
belongs to the second or third group, the protocol stops.
On the other hand, when the result belongs to the first
group we have to repeat our protocol as the obtained
result keeps the structure of the initial state.
Let us now pass to the protocol. Assume that the
parties repeat the measurement M times, but in such
way that in each round the value of ǫ in the definition of
POVM differs. Precisely, following Ref. [15] we utilize
ǫi = 1/
√
1 + i, however, in a reversed order, i.e., in the
first round we take ǫM = 1/
√
1 +M and in the last one
ǫ1 = 1/2.
Taking into account a single success outcome V ⊗2ǫ ⊗Wǫ
(corresponding to the secure key distillation between the
first and second party), the state after M measurements
5is of the form ρ
(D,M)
AA′
= G
(M)
D /Tr(G
(M)
D ), where[29]
G
(M)
D = V˜
⊗2
ǫM
⊗ W˜ǫM̺(D,3)AA′ V˜ ⊗2ǫM ⊗ W˜ǫM
+V˜ǫM−1V˜ǫM ⊗ V˜ǫM−1 V˜ǫM ⊗ W˜ǫM−1 V˜ǫM
×̺(D,3)
AA′
V˜ǫM V˜ǫM−1 ⊗ V˜ǫM V˜ǫM−1 ⊗ V˜ǫM W˜ǫM−1
...
+V˜ǫ1 . . . V˜ǫM ⊗ V˜ǫ1 . . . V˜ǫM ⊗ W˜ǫ1 V˜ǫ2 . . . V˜ǫM̺(D,3)AA′
×V˜ǫM . . . V˜ǫ1 ⊗ V˜ǫM . . . V˜ǫ1 ⊗ V˜ǫM V˜ǫ2 . . . W˜ǫ1 . (13)
The probability of appearance of ρ
(D,M)
AA′
is given by
q
(M)
D = (2M
2(D + 4) +M(2D + 7))/6(D + 4)(M + 1)2.
Let us briefly explain Eq. (13). The first term corre-
sponds to the success obtained in the first round of the
protocol, while the second term is responsible for the out-
come from the first group obtained in the first round and
the success obtained in the second round. The remaining
terms may be derived in an analogous way.
Since we chose the success outcome corresponding to
the key distillation between parties A1 and A2 we can
trace the key part of the last party of ρ
(D,M)
AA′
, getting
the state ρ
(D,M)
A1A2A′
. As we are interested in application of
the DW protocol we can apply the privacy squeezing with
the same twisting operation Ut as in previous subsection,
which effectively removes the shield part and produces
finally
ρ˜
(D,M)
A1A2
=
1
G(M)D


2 2M+1
M+1 0 0 0
0 2D + 3 D 0
0 D 2D + 3 0
0 0 0 6

 , (14)
where G(M)D = 2[2M(D+ 4) + 2D + 7]/(M + 1).
The remaining two success outcomes of the POVM
(corresponding to Vǫ⊗Wǫ⊗Vǫ and Wǫ⊗V ⊗2ǫ ) lead after
M rounds to exactly the same two–qubit states as in Eq.
(14), however, shared by the parties A1 and A3, and A2
and A3, respectively. Also, probabilities of obtaining the
respective states are the same and equal to q
(M)
D . Let
us notice also that in the asymptotic limit M → ∞ the
probability q
(M)
D tends to one–third. It means that tak-
ing into account all the three success outputs we are sure
that in the limit of M →∞ the secure bit will be shared
by one of the pairs of parties.
Finally, in the same way as previously we get
KD(̺
(D,3)
A1A2A′
) ≥ q(M)D [I(A1 :A2)− I(A1 :E)] , (15)
where I are calculated for reductions of the ccq state
ρ˜
(ccq)
A1A2E
(in B) of ρ˜(D,M)A1A2 . The behavior of the function ap-
pearing on the right–hand side of the above, i.e., the dif-
ference between mutual information multiplied by q
(M)
D
(denoted by KDW ) is presented in Fig. 2. On the other
hand, one may prove analytically that it is possible to get
a secure key from ρ˜
(ccq)
A1A2E
. Namely, notice that the limit
of ρ˜
(D,M)
A1A2
with D →∞ has nonzero KD by the DW pro-
tocol and thus, by continuity of the involved functions
there must exist such D that ρ˜
(ccq)
A1A2E
has also nonzero
KD.
2
80
250
500
750
1000
D
1
20
40
60
80
100
M
0.03
0.06
KDW
FIG. 2: The dependence of KDW on M and D. Zero is put
whenever the plotted function is less than zero and, for con-
venience, it is presented as a function of continuous M and
D. Interestingly, the nonzero values appear at about D = 80,
while in the analogous plot (Fig. 1a) nonzero values are from
about D = 2000. Moreover, it is clear that in the case of
the random protocol the distillable key is bounded by larger
values. Consequently, it is very reasonable to suspect that by
using the random protocol one can distill more secure key.
To finish our considerations we discuss what rates
of multipartite key are achievable within the described
method. We already know that to get the multipartite
key it suffices to have secure key between some properly
chosen parties. However in previous cases we needed to
divide protocol into separate N − 1 bipartite determin-
istic protocols, while here we get different bipartite keys
in one deterministic protocol. This suggests that we can
think a little bit clever while estimating the multipartite
key rate here.
For this purpose let us focus on the three–partite case
and and consider the rates r1, r2, r3, where r1 is a key rate
between A1 and A2 and so on. Assume that all the rates
ri are positive and form the triangle inequality. In this
case there exist a triple of positive numbers a, b, c such
that (r1, r2, r3) = (a+ b, b+ c, c+ a), it is not difficult to
conclude that the rate of multipartite key may be lower
bounded by a + b + c = (r1 + r2 + r3)/2. For ̺
(D,N)
AA′
all rates ri are equal to KDW and the obtainable rate of
multipartite key is (3/2)KDW .
Distillation of a ”truly” random secure key – is this
possible for bound entangled states? In the previous sec-
tion we have considered random distillation of a secure
key. In this process all the parties have to cooperate.
Indeed the performances of the protocol have been es-
timated with privacy squeezing involving all ”primed”
parties as a shield part. This means that during the pro-
tocol the passive parties (like A3 in the analysis from the
previous subsection) were trusted in the sense that keep
their ”primed” subsystems (A′3) and do not give it to
Eve.
This means that effectively the bipartite key between
6A1 and A2 can only at this early stage get correlated to
the third party. But what if we were interested in a true
random bipartite key, i.e., such that after the random
bipartite protocol the (random) bipartite key is secure
not only against Eve but also against other parties?
This may be also related to a two–stages protocol:
N trusted parties representing some public company are
given N–partite state and distill such random key in a
way that it is truly bipartite. After that, N different par-
ties come and use that key having all the bipartite secure
communications guaranteed.
Note that this kind of random secure key would share
with entanglement the monogamy property. The natu-
ral question is which multipartite bound entangled states
can lead to the key with such a property. Preliminary
analysis of our W–like states seems to suggests that it is
impossible to get such key form our states.
Discussion. – We have provided a construction of
novel multipartite bound entangled states with underly-
ing W–type structure. The states satisfy PPT test for
any (N − 1)|1 partition. We have analyzed distillation
of a secure key form the states in two different ways.
The first one is based on the usual bipartite filtering–
based protocol followed by the DW scheme. The second
one involves random distillation of secure key. Though
we have not proven the optimality of the protocols, the
present results suggest that, as in the entanglement dis-
tillation, the random distillation of a secure key may be
much more efficient in the distillation of a multipartite
cryptographic key in cases when one deals with underly-
ing W–type structure. However, since the present states
are the first bound entangled states of this type, still fur-
ther analysis is necessary. One also expects that bound
entanglement of other multipartite types like graph states
[20] may be also constructed and found to be useful in
quantum cryptography. It is interesting to address this
type of questions in the context of recently discovered
thermal bound entanglement in quantum arrays and lat-
tices [21]. On the other hand, one may ask about the
distillation of a quantum key in a modified sense: this
would be the ”truly” random bipartite key in the sense
that bipartite cryptographic correlations were secure not
only against Eve but also against all the remaining par-
ties. Note that, of course this is possible in case of some
free entangled states: Lo–Fortesque protocol followed by
classical measurement of entangled pairs provides natu-
rally such key. Here the natural question arises which
bound entangled states lead to such key.
Another natural question concerns the relation of the
present results to quantum channels capacities. Indeed
the present states as well as the states from [14] may be
immediately used to generate a quantum channel (with
k senders and n − k receivers). It is interesting that
while the one–sender channels created from the GHZ–
type states [14] have strictly positive one–way multipar-
tite privacy capacity P nonzero (due to generalized DW
protocol) it seems to be rather unlikely that the channels
based on the present W -like states have that property.
Still, in context of fascinating and still uncovered role of
privacy in the recently discovered superactivation effect
of quantum bipartite capacity [22], and especially in the
context of multipartite superactivation and activation of
quantum capacities and entanglement (see [23]), further
analysis of quantum channels based on the present states
seems to be interesting.
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